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Patents / Biotechnology / US Biotechnology Practice |
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5. Inventorship The
United States Constitution provides for the grant of patents to "inventors"
and, unlike most countries in the world, patent applications must be filed in
the name of the actual inventors of the subject matter to be protected and not
in the name of their employer or other assignees. The requirement of United
States law that patents are granted not to the first person to file a patent
application, but (subject to certain provisos) to the first person to invent
the subject matter makes the question of determining actual inventorship more
important in United States patent practice than elsewhere.
The
issue of inventorship is always a difficult one. However, it seems clear that
merely suggesting an idea or desideratum without suggesting means to implement
the idea or to achieve the desideratum is not itself an act of inventorship, at
least in cases where the recipient of the idea or suggestion had to carry out
substantial experimentation to achieve a practical result.
[78]
Indeed, in
Huck
v. Textron
[79]
the court stated:
The suggestion or conception of an idea or appreciation of a result to be accomplished, rather than the means of accomplishing it, particularly when the means constitute an essential part of the invention, does not constitute joint or sole inventorship. The mere fact that others made suggestions and possibly gave assistance does not necessarily make them inventors. On
the other hand, the courts have held that once conception has occurred, the
inventor may make use of the services of others in perfecting his invention
without losing his right to a patent
[80]
and that merely taking the idea of another and devising alternative means of
implementation does not rise to the level of "inventorship".
[81]
A person who merely suggests something to aim at without contributing to the
means needed to reach that objective will not normally be an inventor, unless
perhaps the definition of the aim was in itself inventive. In the case of new
chemical compounds, an idea as to the use of the compound is necessary for
conception to be complete.
A
useful example of how to determine inventorship is found in the AZT case,
Burroughs
Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories Inc. [82]
In this case the facts were as follows:
1)
the NIH had devised a test to test the efficacy of candidates for inhibition of
HIV using live HIV and a unique line of T-cell clones.
In
an infringement action, the defendant argued that the invention had not been
made until the NIH testing was done and that the persons at the NIH who had
carried out the tests were co-inventors. In their view up to that point
conception of the invention was not complete. As noted by the court,
They argue that [reasonable] expectation [of success] is of paramount importance when the invention deals with uncertain or experimental disciplines, where the inventor cannot reasonably believe an idea will be operable until some result supports that conclusion. Without some experimental confirmation, they suggest, the inventor has only a hope or an expectation and has not yet conceived the invention in sufficiently definite and permanent form. But this is not the law. An inventor's belief that his invention will work or his reasons for choosing a particular approach are irrelevant to conception. The
draft patent application was found to be ample evidence that the invention had
been made without the contribution of the NIH. The Court noted that conception
is the touchstone of inventorship and so each inventor had to contribute to the
conception of the invention and this was complete when only ordinary skill
would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice without extensive
research or experimentation.
Although
it is not necessary for inventors physically to work together for them to be
joint inventors, some form of collaboration between them is necessary.
[83]
35 USC 116 sets out certain rules on the question of joint inventorship
pointing out that to be a joint inventor, each inventor may make a different
type or amount of contribution, and that it is no longer necessary that each
inventor made a contribution to every claim.
[84]
It is, however, necessary that each inventor made a contribution to at least
one claim.
[85]
[78]
See, for example,
Garrett
Corporation v. United States,
422 F.2d 874, 164 USPQ 521 (Ct. of Clms. 1970) and
International
Carrier-Call and Television Corp. v. RCA,
142 F.2d 493, 61 USPQ 392 (2nd Cir. 1944).
[79]
187 USPQ 388 (S.D. Mich. 1975).
[80]
Central
Soya v. Hormel, 205 USPQ 421 (W.D. Okla. 1979), aff'd 645 F.2d 847, 209 USPQ 915 (10th Cir.
1981).
[81]
Dow
Corning v. Surgitek, 378 F.Supp 1128, 182 USPQ 688 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
[82]
40 F.3d 1223, 32 USPQ2d 1915 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
[83]
Kimberly
Clark Corp v. Procter
& Gamble Distributing Company Inc., 23
USPQ2d 1921 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
[84]
35 USC § 116 was amended in 1984 to provide that a joint inventor need not make a
contribution to every claim of the patent.
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© Copyright 2002 John Richards - Posted July 2002
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